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CIVIL RIGHTS-FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT § 47(3) PERMITS CIVIL
ACTION ONLY AGAINST PERSONS ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAWPlaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendants, pursuant to 'a conspiracy,
broke up a public meeting called by a Democratic political club to petition
Congress in opposition to the Marshall Plan. Plaintiffs sought to invoke
a long dormant civil rights statute providing civil remedies "if two or
more persons . . . conspire" to deprive anyone "of the equal protection

of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," and if
they act in furtherance of the conspiracy "whereby an6ther is deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States."' Reversing the Court of Appeals, 2 the Supreme Court held that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, because, with a possible
exception,3 only persons acting under color of state law can "deprive"
anyone of "the equal 4 protection of the laws." Collins v. Hardyman, 71
Sup. Ct. 937 (1951).
This statute was part of the post Civil War legislation designed to
implement the Fourteenth Amendment, cope with the Ku Klux Klan, and
put the newly freed Negro on equal footing with white persons. 5 As part
of the "Ku Klux Klan Act" of April 20, 1871, § 47(3) was joined with
what is now § 43, which brovides a civil action for deprivation of rights
of federal citizenship by persons acting under color of law.6 Both these
civil acts have criminal counterparts. 7 Section 242 proscribes deprivations of civil rights by one acting under color of state law in language
almost identical to § 43, and the two statutes have been held in pari
nateria.8 Section 241 applies to acts pursuant to a conspiracy by "two
or more persons" to prevent or hinder "the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured . . . by the Constitution or laws of the
1. REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 8 U.S.C. §47(3) (1946).
2. Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1950); 99 U. oF PA. L. REv.
534 (1951).
3. ". . . the post Civil War Ku Klux Klan, against which this act was fashioned,
may have" worked "a deprivation of equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under laws." Instant case at 942.
4. The opinion was delivered by Justice Jackson. Justices Burton, Black and
Douglas dissented.
5. Hardyman v. Collins, supra note 2 at 311-312. See also note 11 infra.
6. Ryv. STAT. §1979 (1875). The two sections were originally §§1 and 2,
c. 22, of the Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, 17 STAT. 13.
7. These four statutes under discussion hereafter will be referred to as follows:
8 U.S.C. § 47(3) as § 47(3) (the statute in the instant case) ; 8 U.S.C. § 43 as § 43
(civil action for deprivation of civil rights by persons acting under color of law) ; 18
U.S.C. § 241 as § 241 (criminal action for conspiracy to prevent enjoyment of federal
rights) ; 18 U.S.C. § 242 as § 242 (criminal action for deprivation of civil rights by
persons acting under color of law).
8. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 1945).
(121)
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United States." It has been held constitutional as applied to conspiracies
of private individuals not acting under color of law,9 and it is probable
that a criminal prosecution and conviction under § 241 for the defendants'
acts alleged in the instant case would be sustained against constitutional
objections.' 0 It is clear that Congress also intended § 47(3) (the statute
in the instant case) to reach private individuals," and it was probably
regarded as creating a civil sanction parallel to § 241.12 But the language
used in § 47(3) is ambiguous in the light of constitutional decisions subsequent to its enactment. The unqualified "two or more persons" and the
fact that the section was joined with § 43, which explicitly reaches deprivations under color of law, strongly support the dissenting opinion's view
that "the language of the statute refutes the suggestion that action under
color of state law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action which it
recognizes." 13 But the conspiracy is described as one to deprive others
"of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws." The decision in the instant case turns on this "equal
9. E.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (conspiracy to deprive citizens of right to vote in federal election); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458
(1900) (conspiracy to injure informer of violations of federal laws).
10. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), the court set aside
convictions under what is now § 241 of persons who had broken up a meeting of
Negroes in Louisiana. But the court said: "The right of the people peaceably to
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for
anything else connected with the powers or duties of the national government, is an
attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed
by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a
right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in
these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a
purpose, the case would have been within the statute. . ." Id. at 552-553. This
point has never been expressly decided, but the Crutikshank dictum has been frequently cited, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) ; In re Quarles,
158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895). "No expression of a contrary view has ever been voiced
by this court." Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939).
"Citizenship of the
United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right
to discuss national legislation. . . ." Ibid. In Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d
147 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 679 (1940), the court sustained demurrers
to indictments under § 241 for a conspiracy to throttle an Alabama editor who had
exposed official tolerance of illegal gambling. The Court of Appeals held that, as
in the Cruikshank case, there was no sufficient explicit federal right involved because the exposures of municipal corruption were not connected with functions of
the national government; but ". . . we do not doubt that Congress may directly
protect its citizens in their right to assemble peaceably and petition the federal
government for redress. . ." Id. at 151.
The assembly in the instant case was to petition Congress about policies of the
federal government. The court "assume[s], without deciding, that the facts pleaded
show that defendants did deprive plaintiffs 'of having and exercising' a federal
right. . . ." Instant case at 941.
11. CoNG. GLOim, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. e.g., 416, 429, 455, 459, Appendix 215. The
prolonged debate revolved around the assumption of both supporters and opponents
that the statute would be applied to private individuals. The main objective was to
reach private individuals banded together in the Ku Klux Klan; "the State government has failed in every instance to punish the Ku Klux crimes." Id. at 439.
12. CoNGa. GaoB, op. cit. sipra note 11, at 383, 452, 461, Appendix 68-69.
13. Instant case at 943. A part of § 47(3), not at issue here, which is an alternative to the conspiracy provision, speaks of persons going "in disguise on the highways . . . for the purpose of depriving" of equal protection.. This was aimed at
the Ku Klux Klan and obviously refers to private individuals.
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protection" language, the majority rigidly applying the doctrine of the
Civil Rights Cases14 that, while individuals may interfere with the enjoy-'
ment of a civil right in a particular instance, the right itself remains undiminished unless the deprivation is "sanctioned in some way by the
state." '1 Such a resolution of the ambiguities"' of §47(3) overlooks
the fact that the rights claimed by plaintiffs here arise under the implied
powers of the Federal Government, without regard to the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, sources of the asserted federal
power in the Civil Rights Cases. The decision ignores the opposite construction of identical language made in United States v. Harris,I7 and
construes ambiguous language contrary to the intent and purpose of Congress.18 In relying upon the distinction of the Civil Rights Cases between
abstract ideal rights as against the practical enjoyment of those rights, the
court has reinforced what stands as a major constitutional stumbling block
against effective federal protection of civil rights.
One factor influencing the court is indicated by the statement that
"California courts are open to plaintiffs and its laws offer redress for their
injury and vindication for their rights." 19 Whether or not California
law offers an enforceable remedy in this instance, 2 0 there have been many
situations in which state law was of small value to despised minorities.
The history of the Negro in the South is a refutation of the doctrine of the
Civil Rights Cases that the rights of Negroes, though interfered with by
wrongful acts of individuals, "remain in full force, and may presumably
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Id. at 17.
16. While the conspiracy is defined in the language of equal rights on which
the decision turns, the overt act requirement is phrased in language similar to that
held constitutional in construing § 241 (see note 9 supra), namely, to deprive one "of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."
17. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). In this case REv. STAT. § 5519 (1875), employing
identical language to §47(3) in describing conspiracies made subject to criminal
penalties, was held unconstitutional because it encompassed state as well as federal
rights and because the court read the language to apply to individual rather than to
state actidn.
18. Justice Jackson notes that the act "was passed by a partisan vote in a highly
inflamed atmosphere" and "its defects were soon realized when its execution brought
about a severe reaction." Instant case at 939, 940. Doubts as to the wisdom of the
legislation as of the time it was enacted 80 years ago hardly seem to justify a narrow
semantic interpretation thwarting the intent of Congress. Cf. Undted States v.
Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 388 (1915), upholding §241, which had been enacted under
similar "inflamed" circumstances: ".

.

. we canont allow the past so far to affect

the present as to deprive citizens of the United States of the general protection
which on its face [§ 241] most reasonably affords." And cf. Colgate-PalmolivePeet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 429 (1943) : ".

.

. an ambiguity of phrase

. . .yields to the intent of Congress as disclosed by the legislative history."
19. Instant case at 942.
20. District Judge Yankwich said that the alleged acts are punislable as disturbance of the peace, disturbance of public meetings, illegal entry, and assault and
battery. Civil remedies in California state law includes trespass to real property and
assault and battery. Hardyman v. Collins, 80 F. Supp. 501, 510 (S.D. Cal. 1948) ;
Instant case at 939n. The opinions do not say whether or not state criminal proceedings were instituted as a result of the alleged violations of California law.
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be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress." -1 The
24
Jehovah's Witnesses, 2 2 the Japanese-Americans,2 and labor organizers
are but a few of the groups who have felt the weight of a persecution
against which state law offered little or no protection.
A civil sanction to parallel the criminal sanction of § 241 could be an
important tool for increased protection of these vital rights, 2 5 and it is to
be regretted that the court frustrated this possibility by its narrow construction of § 47(3) 2 While it may be true in the long run that "the
cure is a reinvigoration of state responsibility," 27 the national importance
of full enjoyment of civil rights would justify an interpretation of the
language of §47(3) in order to effectuate the Congressional purpose of
protecting such democratic essentials as assembly to discuss national affairs
and to petition Congress.2 8 The fact that there may be existing state
remedies should be no barrier to the existence of concurrent federal
remedies where Congress feels, as in enacting this statute, that ifi
practice
the states may be unwilling or unable to give sufficient redress for the
21. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 14 at 17. The President's Committee on
Civil Rights notes that "the almost complete immunity from punishment enjoyed by
lynchers i5 merely a striking form of the broad and general immunity from punishment enjoyed by whites in many communities for less extreme offenses against
Negroes." "To SEcuRE THESE
CIVIL RIGHTS 24 (1947).

RIGHTS," REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMrrr

ON

22. For two years "the files
of the Department of Justice reflect an uninterrupted
record of violence and persecution of the Witnesses." Rotnem and Folsom, Recent
Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty, 36 Am. POL Sci. Rzv. 1053, 1061 (1942). See
also CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 15 (1947).
23. Id. at 17-19.

24. Hearings before Subcomnnittee of Committee on Education and Labor Pursuant to S. Res. 266, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936, 1938-9).
25. "In many instances a civil action will accomplish results when criminal proceedings will not, because a jury which might be reluctant to convict a defendant in
a criminal prosecution for a violation of civil rights might not hesitate to afford relief
in the form of a civil penalty." "To SECURE THESE RIGHTS," op. cit. supra note 21,
at 130. See also Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of
Justice, 1 BILL or RIGHTS REv. 206, 216 (1941).
26. Although there is no mention of it, the court may also have been influenced by the fear of Healy, J., dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that ". . . the
federal government through its courts will from now on be under the necessity of
policing political meetings throughout the whole of the forty-eight states." Supra
note 2 at 319. Because of the narrow range of rights protected, the Court of
Appeals majority doubted that it was opening the sluices to a flood of cases.
"If . . . the load becomes too burdensome, it then becomes a matter with which
.Congress must deal." Id. at 314.
27. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 160 (1945) (dissenting opinion of
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter and Roberts.)
This dissent deplored the prosecution under § 241, of a southern sheriff for killing a Negro prisoner, as "an undue
incursion of remote Federal authority" into a "sphere of the criminal law traditionally and naturally reserved for the states alone," with a "consequent debilitation
of local responsibility." Id. at 148-149, 160-161. Yet the same opinion notes that the
prosecution under § 241 was undertaken only because Georgia took no action whatsoever. See also CAR, op. cit. supra note 22, at 107.
28. ". . . while we cannot ask our appellate courts to hold valid laws which
they believe to be invalid, we may reasonably expect them to be sympathetic toward
efforts to protect civil rights, and to interpret fairly and generously statutes designed
for that purpose." "To SECURE THESE RIGHTS," op. cit. supra note 21, at 132.
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deprivation of federal rights.2 9 Enforcement of the criminal sections of
the civil rights statutes has shown the value of such concurrent federal
remedies, for under these statutes convictions have been obtained in federal
courts when local and state government have done nothing.30
This decision destroys the possibility that §47(3) could play a
significant part in an expanding federal role in the protection of civil
rights, and leaves no federal civil remedy where the injuries are inflicted
by private individuals. This emphasizes the need for comprehensive civil
rights legislation freed from the technical defects and inadequacies of the
post Civil War statutes. The proposed Civil Rights Acts of 194931 and
1951 32 would amend §241, expanding the scope of its constitutionallytested language to cover individual as well as conspiratorial invasions of
civil rights, and to create concurrent civil remedies. Coupled with this
need for legislation is the importance of constitutional development expanding the narrow area of federal rights which such legislation would
protect. The Constitutional basis of federal protection of civil rights
against individual invasions rests in the implied power of Congress to
preserve the integrity of the functions and processes which are essential
to a republican form of government.3 While it has been narrowly construed, 34 it is logically capable of substantial expansion. If the implied
power embraces the right of assembly to petition Congressa3 or the right
of free "spealdng and printing on subjects relating to [the Federal] govermnent,"3 6 then many civil rights violations now left to state law could
be reached when essential federal functions were involved. But further
probing of the limits of this power, in civil actions for individual deprivations such as the instant case, will now have to await enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1951 or comparable legislation.
29. "There is ample precedent for Federal intervention where local criminal
elements create situations of national concern." Statement of American Jewish Congress, Hearings before Subcoininittee No. 4 of Committee oin the Judiciary on H. R.
41 [and others], 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1948).

See, e.g., the Lindbergh Anti-

Kidnapping law, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1948), the National Stolen Property Act, 18
U.S.C. §§413-419 (1948).
30. E.g., Screws v. United States, spra note 27; Catlette v. United States, 132
F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943) (Jehovah's Witnesses forced to drink castor oil, run out of
town by mob headed by Deputy Sheriff); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84
(5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 873 (1945). In these cases local and state
authorities failed to prosecute. Cmu., op. cit. supra note 22, at 107, 118, 158.
31. 81st Cong., S. 1725, H.R. 4682. See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3
of Committee on the Judiciary on. H.R. 4682 [and others], 81st Cong., 1st and 2d

Sess. (1950).

32. 82d Cong., H.R. 29, S. 1735, S. 1737.

33. Ex parte Yarbrough, supra note 9 at 657, 658. "This duty [protection of
right to vote] does not arise solely from the interest of the party concerned, but from
the necessity of the government itself..." Id. at 662. And see United States v.
Cruikshank, supra note 10.
34. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
35. Supra note 10.
36. Powe v. United States, supra, note 10, at 151.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS--FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-REFUSAL TO HONOR

DEATH STATUTE OF ANOTHER STATE AS REPUGNANT TO PUBLIC POLICY
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Plaintiff administrator, whose son had been
killed in an automobile accident in Illinois, brought suit in Wisconsin for
wrongful death. The allegedly negligent defendant, plaintiff, and his
decedent were all residents of Wisconsin under whose laws the defendant
insurance company was also incorporated. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Hughes v. Fetter:'held that the full faith and credit clause 2 did
not require it to enforce the rights created by the Illinois wrongful death
statute,3 which it held to be contrary to Wisconsin policy as manifested
in the provision of Wisconsin's death statute restricting the action to
deaths "caused in this state." 4 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court judgment was reversed in a five to four decision.5 Justice Black's
majority opinion declared that the full faith and credit clause did not
automatically compel the forum state to subordinate its statutory policy
to the conflicting lex loci delecti. Rather in such a clash of interests it was
for the Supreme Court to choose between the competing public policies.0
In the instant case Wisconsin, by reason of its own statute, could have no
strong hostility toward wrongful death actions in general, and therefore
it must honor the Illinois statute. No state could be permitted to escape
its constitutional obligation of enforcing rights arising in another state
by the simple expedient of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise
competent. 7 While a remedy for a cause of action might sometimes be
denied under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,8 that doctrine was
not here applicable because of the close relation of the litigants to Wisconsin. The Court also felt that it was relevant, though not crucial, that
Wisconsin might be the only jurisdiction where service as an original
matter could be had on the corporate defendant. Hughes v. Fetter, 71
Sup. Ct. 980 (U.S. 1951).
The brevity of the majority opinion in a field where no consistent
pattern can be discerned in the cases 9 is to be regretted. Former decisions
had established that jurisdiction might not be denied a suit on a judgment
of another state merely because the forum state would not have recognized

1. 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950) ; see 64 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1950).
2. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
3. IL. Axi. STAT. c. 70, §§ 1, 2 (Smith-Hurd, 1949).
4. Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1947). Previously the statutory policy had been overlooked. In Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935), an action was allowed for a death in Illinois even after counsel had called attention to a similar provision in the Illinois statute.
5. Jurisdiction was conferred by 62 STAT. 929, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. 1948).
- 6. See Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1934).
7. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224
U.S. 243 (1912).
8. See Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373,
(1904) ; cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946).
9. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COL L. Rv. 1, 16 (1945).
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the right of action on which the judgment was based.' 0 However, various
cases have indicated that under the full faith and credit clause the statutes
of a state are for most purposes not entitled to the same judicial recognition as its judgments." In a suit on an unlitigated cause of action the
forum state has been allowed greater freedom in asserting its own policy
than where the litigants have already had their, day in court. An examination of the differences between judgments and rights created by a foreign
statute is probably not so helpful in explaining this result as is an inquiry
into the political factors affecting the extent to which it is desirable to
subordinate local policy to wider considerations.' 2 In part, the difference
in treatment has also rested on Congressional failure to prescribe the
extra-state effect to be accorded public acts.' 3 Subsequent to those decisions the judicial code was revised so as to grant such acts the same constitutional privileges as the records and judgments of another state.14 In
deciding the present case the Supreme Court expressly declined to rely
on the legislative modification, 15 thereby implying that the full faith and
credit clause is self-executing.
In the past the policy of the Court in conflict of law cases has varied
with the subject matter. In commercial law, where certainty is of the
highest importance to a national economy, the full faith and credit clause
has been used as a unifying force, compelling the forum state to defer to
the law of the state of incorporation, 16 or of the place of contract.' 7 More
recent decisions have suggested a shift in policy, but the present state of
the law in this field is not entirely clear.' 8
10. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S.
411 (1919) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). A court may only go behind
the judgment of another state and refuse to enforce it if the original cause of action
was penal, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888), or if the rendering
Court lacked jurisdiction, Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873).
11. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Williams v.
State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Milwaukee County v. M,E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
12. See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Court Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HAIv. L. REv. 533, 547 (1926).
13. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,
502 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,
547 (1934).
14. 62 STAT. 947, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1948).
15. Instant case at 983.
16. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237
U.S. 531 (1915).
17. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) ; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
18. In Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941), the Court held
that an assessment valid under the law of the state of incorporation of a mutual insurance company did not prevent the forum court from supplying its own interpretation of the obligations of the policy, and from declining to enforce the assessment
against local policy holders. -Previously the Court had permitted the forum court
to determine whether or not it would enforce an insurance policy, made in another
state, in favor of beneficiaries with no insurable interest under local law. Griffin
But in Order of United Commercial Travellers
v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1940).
v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1946), the Court enforced a duration of liability limitation
which was valid in the state of incorporation but void under the law of the forum.
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In workmen's compensation cases the Court's appreciation of the
forum's concern in providing an adequate remedy for the injured workman, plus the difficulties of selecting either the place of injury or the
place of contract as determinative of which forum's laws control, have led
to decisions balancing the interests of the states concerned, rather than
applying a certain rule. Either the fact that the injury occurred within
20
the forum state, 19 or that the contract of employment was made there,
has been sufficient to justify the enforcement of local policy. Even where
neither of these events have occurred within the forum state, it is still
possible for the jurisdiction to have a sufficient connection with the employer-employee relationship to apply its own laws.21 The Supreme
Court has here proceeded on the theory that "prima fade every state is
entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes lawfully enacted." 22
In tort actions, where there is not the pre-existing relationship of
the workmen's compensation cases, there seems still less reason to restrict
the exercise of local policy.2 The rights of the litigants may well be less
prejudiced if a state court is allowed to decline a suit than if the forum
is required to accept the foreign right of action but permitted to tailor it
to fit local standards, even though in the latter event excessive provincialism
in the application of conflicts of law rules could in part be restrained
through the full faith and credit or due process clauses.2 4 If the suit is
declined, the plaintiff will ordinarily be free to sue in another court and
then return to assert his judgment.2 5 Occasionally, inability to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant will prevent recovery elsewhere, but, at
least where automobiles are involved, common provisions for substituted
service will frequently meet the problem.26 This approach will best preserve the independence of the state tribunals. On the other hand, justice
to the litigants (here defined as a uniform result regardless of the forum
in which suit is brought) requires that before the appropriate foreign law
is rejected on policy grounds, it should first violate the forum's funda27
mental principles of justice or some prevalent conception of good morals.
Especially where the conflict of laws is between states of the union, the
decision should rise above local fancy regarding debatable questions, for
the litigant is not impugning local policy but only asking to have legal
28
effect given acts according to the law under which they were performed.
19. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939). But cf. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
20. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1934).
21. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
22. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1934).
23. See principal case at p. 985 (the dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter).
24. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
25. See note 10 sipra.
26. In the instant case jurisdiction over the individual defendant could be obtained
in Illinois. ILT_ AxN. STAT. C. 95Y, § 23 (Smith-Hurd, 1950).
27. See Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
28. See GooDmicH, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 11 (1949); Beach, Uniform Interstate
Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656 (1918).
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The Supreme Court, following the rule of Swift v. Tyson,2 9 made it clear
that no trivial policy differences would justify a court in not honoring
the applicable statute of a sister state.30 While once it seemed possible
that an erroneous decision in conflict of law would not raise a federal
question,3 1 that doubt is past, and now it appears possible to impose nationwide uniformity in this field under the full faith and credit clause.
Further decisions will tell whether the instant case is a step on that
path or only a commentary on the insubstantial character of Wisconsin's
policy. Since the Supreme Court is the arbiter of the constitutional interests of the several states, it must make its own evaluation of the sufficiency of the asserted policy grounds on which one state infringes the
rights of another. The Wisconsin court in the principal case simply declared that its exclusionary policy was fixed by the statutory provision
that the action be for death "caused in this state." 32 That proviso could
as readily have been construed as stating the usual conflicts rule that the
statute of the jurisdiction where death was caused governs. The Wisconsin death statute of 1857 was one of the first, and in those days, because of the strangeness of the new action and the uncertainty of the law
concerning the enforcement of foreign statutory rights, courts were most
reluctant to entertain suits based on deaths occurring outside of their
jurisdiction. The tendency was to deny recovery as against public policy
33
if the statute of the forum state was dissimilar to the foreign statute.
A few courts, including Wisconsin, went still further and held that a
statutory right of action unknown at common law could only be enforced
in the state creating the right 3 4 The real basis of the restrictive proviso
in the original Wisconsin statute was probably the fear and doubt of
courts in enforcing these new rights. Recent revisions of that wrongful
death act have not been concerned with this section 3 5 and can not be
considered legislative re-declarations of policy in this respect, particularly
since the state courts before Hughes v. Fetter had been willing to accept
actions on foreign deaths.3 6 There seems to be little justification for the
Wisconsin court's return to outmoded concepts. The state's own statute
indicates that it has no aversion to death actions as such. There is a
certain danger of multiple suits by personal representatives in allowing
an action on out of state deaths, but it is no greater in such a case than in
any other suit brought by an administrator on a transitory action.3 7 Other
29. 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
30. Stewart v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 168 U.S. 445 (1897); Northern Pacific
R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1893).
31. See Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916).
32. Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1947).
33. See Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MiCH.
L. REv. 545, 560 (1935).
34. See, e.g., Anderson v. RR. Co., 37 Wis. 321 (1875).
35. The last revision of this section occurred in 1898 when it was amended to remove a possible bar to suits elsewhere for a death in Wisconsin. Wis. REv. STAT.

§ 4255 (1898).

36. See note 4 supra.
37. See GooDRicH, CoNrucr

oF LAws

§ 191 (1949).
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possible reasons for Wisconsin's course include docket clearing and the
protection of its residents from suits where out of state witnesses may
be difficult to obtain, but these grounds seem insufficient to warrant the
hardship worked on litigants or to justify the disregard of Illinois' constitutionally protected interest in the remedy extended by other states to
rights arising under its statutes. Apparently the Illinois courts would
have done no more had positions been reversed,38 and conceivably a basis
of the Wisconsin decision may have been retaliation or a tacit acceptance
of the dated doctrine 6f reciprocity, but such considerations have no proper
place in a court of law.3 9
The United States Supreme Court has from the first regarded wrongful death as a transitory action.40 Even where a state has attempted to
retain exclusive jurisdiction, the court has distinguished the right from
the remedy and held that the full faith and credit clause does not require
another forum to observe the frequent requirement that suit first be
brought in the home courts. 4 1 Similarly the court of appeals has held that
a federal court sitting in Illinois may accept a suit for a death occurring
in Michigan notwithstanding Illinois' statutory policy against such actions. It declared that the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 4 did not
apply for it was not a substantive question but one of jurisdiction, and a
state can not control the jurisdiction of a federal court.43 As the instant
case makes plain the converse of that proposition is not true. A state
that can not base its denial of jurisdiction on a strong and coherent policy
is required by the full faith and credit clause to provide a remedy for
rights created by the dtatutes of other states. ThE utility of each of the
prevalent American conflict of law thkeories 44 may have deterred the
Supreme Court from committing itself to any particular view, but unmistakably this recent decision has more in common with Brandeis' desire
for uniformity 4 5 or Holmes' espousal7 of vested rights, 4 6 than with the
4
latitude of the late Chief Justice Stone.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-INTERSTATE

SUPREME COURT TO INTERPRET STATE

COMPACTS-POWER

CONSTITUTIoNs-West

OF

THE

Virginia

and seven other states, with the consent of Congress, entered into a com38. See Dougherty v. Ameican McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N.E. 619
(1912).
39. See Rose, .rpra note 33, at 561.
40. Dennick v. Central R.R. of NJ., 103 U.S. 11 (1880).
41. Tennessee Coal Iron and R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
42. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43. Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 110 F.2d 401 (7th Cir.
1940), disposed of without consideration, 311 U.S. 720 (1941).
44. See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1945); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 656 (1918).
45. E.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1934).
46. E.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R.. 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
47. See Freund, Chief J.stice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L.
REv. 1210 (1946).
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pact to control pollution of streams in the Ohio River Valley.: The legislature of West Virginia appropriated its annual share to the commission
set up by the compact, but the state auditor refused to honor the appropriation. In an original mandamus proceeding to compel payment by the
auditor, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held the act of
the legislature approving the compact 2 to be violative of the state constitution because the legislature exceeded its power in delegating police power
to an interstate agency, and because the compact bound future legislatures,
in perpetuity, in the exercise of the police power and in the making of
appropriations for the administration of the compact.3 On certiorari the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compact did not
violate the constitution -of West Virginia. West Virginia v. Sims, 341
U. S. 22 (1951).
J
Compacts among the states for the adjustment of controversies and
the solution of common problems are impliedly provided for by a qualified
prohibition in Article I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution.4 Although early
resort was had to this means of adjustment and its equivalents of the
colonial period,5 recent years have seen a geometrically progressive increase in the use of this device in broadening fields. 6 Contributing to
this increase is the encouragement accorded the use of interstate compacts
by Congress and the Court, both of which have come to realize the impracticality of huge suits between states and the impossibility of needed
long-term surveillance through litigation.7 The power of the federal courts
to interpret interstate compacts is now established by the cases.8 The
Supreme Court has also undertaken to interpret the laws of a state alleged
to be in conflict with a compact, 9 and for such considerations a state con1. Ohio River Sanitation Compact (1948), in ILL. LAWS 1939, p. 310; IND. LAWS
1939, c. 315; Ky. AcTs 1940, c. 150; N.Y. LAW 1939, c. 945; OHIo LAws 1939,

p. 447; PA. Acts 1938, c. 117; W. VA. Acrs 1939, c. 38.

2. W. VA. AcTs 1939, c. 38.
3. State ex tel. Dyer v. Sims, 58 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1950).
4. "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another State. . . ." For a discussion of the theory that Congressional consent is required only where the compact is of a political nature or encroaches on some otherwise federal province, see WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTrON OF THE
UNITE. STATES § 172 (2d ed. 1929); 45 YALE L.J. 324 (1936).
5. For a history of the development of the compact clause and the prevalence of
compacts, see Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study inr Interstate Adjustments, 3, YALE L.J. 685 (1925) ; A.M. Dodd, Interstate
Compacts, 70 U.S.L. REv. 557 (1936); A.M. Dodd, Interstate Compacts-Recent
Developments, 73 U.S.L. REv. 75 (1939).
6. Some of these fields are boundary disputes, conservation of natural resources,
control and improvement of navigation, utility regulation, penal jurisdiction, control of
stream pollution, labor legislation, flood control, control of soil erosion, taxation and

financial settlement.

7. Instant case at 26. Congress has passed several acts giving blanket consent

for states to enter into compacts in certain fields. See, e.g., 62 STAT. 1155 (1948), 33
U.S.C. § 466a (Supp. 1950), giving blanket consent for interstate compacts to control
stream pollution.
8. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419
(1940) and cases cited.
9. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930) ; Hinderliter v. La Plata Co., 304

U.S. 92 (1938).
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stitution, as involved in the present case, stands on the same footing as a
state law.10 The source of the Court's power along these lines is not
clear; its obscurity may be attributable to the fact that the precise status
of a compact has not been defined. It appears to be a hybrid mutation,
closely resembling a contract in many respects, yet bearing qualities of a
treaty which ought to be treated in accordance with the principles of
international law.'
In Green v. Biddle the Court equates the terms compact and contract, 12 but other reported cases have been satisfied to draw
only an analogy between the two. 13 Whether by synonymy or analogy,
however, compact law may at least be said to be developing along lines
parallel to the law concerning state impairment of the obligations of contract. An alternative source of power is the constitutional power to decide
litigated controversies between states, extended to include power to oversee
interstate compacts. In the final analysis cases growing out of interstate
compacts may in fact constitute a separate class governed by a "federal
common law" 14 or "interstate law" emanating from the decisions of the
Supreme Court.
The present case may serve to draw the concept of "interstate law"
more clearly into focus in this field. It represents the most vivid pronouncement to date of the Supreme Court's intention to declare the law
of interstate compacts. It is based on the relatively simple proposition
that, as a practical matter, a state is incompetent to determine the existence
or extent of an obligation to which it is a party, or its own capacity to
undertake it. The lack of any defined source for the Court's power in
these cases compels its reliance upon "principles it must have power to
declare." 15 It is significant to note that this decision is not in keeping
with the general reluctance of the Court to interpret a state law or constitution only as a last resort. That the decision could have been grounded
upon an interpretation of the compact alone is apparent from a reading
of Judge Given's dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court of West Virginia.16 The election to rest it upon an absence of state constitutional
disability indicates more strongly the Court's willingness to assume a
greater degree of control. Meriting consideration, however, is the fact
that the Court was not dealing here with specific wording of a state con10. Cf. Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 (U.S. 1870); Bier v. McGehee,
148 U.S. 137 (1893) (a state constitution is a "law" of the state within the meaning of the clause in the U.S. Constitution forbidding state impairment of obligations
of contract).
11. Note, 35 COL. L. Rlv. 76 (1935).
12. 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
13. Kentucky v. Indiana, supra note 9.
14. Hinderliter v. La Plata Co., supra note 9, and cases cited therein. For discussion that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) has not swept away all
federal common law, see Newman, The Federal Comnon Law, 26 DicrA 303 (1949);
44 Dicit L. RFv. 319 (1940).
15. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1905).
16. State v. Sims, supra note 3 (dissenting opinion). Commented on in 50 CoL.
L. REv. 994 (1950).
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stitution,17 but rather with a general constitutional principle claimed to
inhere in the law of West ,Virginia.'8 What result will follow when the
Court is obliged to give meaning to particular language in the face of state
decision to the contrary is purely speculative. But the ethos of this decision champions broadly and generally the compact as a means of interstate
adjustment.

CORPORATIONS-AMENDMENT
TO

Buy STocK

MAY NOT BE

OF BY-LAWS-SHAREIOLDER

OPTION

ALTERED--A by-law of the Coleman Realty

Company provided that no stock could be sold or transferred to a nonholder until an offer to sell, at book value, had been made to the corporation or remaining stockholder in proportion to their interest.' At
a stockholders' meeting in 1949 the above by-law was repealed by vote
of the majority stockholder, pursuant to another by-law which provided for amendment by shareholders owning and voting a majority of
the shares.2 The minority stockholders filed a bill in equity to have the
repeal adjudged invalid. Reversing a dismissal of the bill, the supreme
court held that the by-law was in the nature of a contract vesting rights
in each shareholder and could not be repealed without consent of the
minority. Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661
(1951).
Restrictions on the transfer of stock are now recognized as valid
even when imposed by corporation by-laws,3 and provisions like the one
considered in the instant case, giving the corporation or stockholders the
first refusal, have been upheld as reasonable and necessary to corporate
management. 4 Pennsylvania has specifically so held.5 It is also established that certain by-law provisions cannot be repealed by a majority,
17. The objection of the state court, based on Art. X, § 4, of the state constitution prohibiting the binding of future legislatures to make appropriations, was resolved by an interpretation of the compact, not the constitution, i.e., there was no
contest over the language of the state constitution; the Court merely held that as it
read the compact, it did not fall within the constitutional prohibition. "In view of
these provisions [in the compact], we conclude that the obligation of the State under
the Compact is not in conflict with Art. 10, § 4 of the State Constitution." Imrtant
case at 32.
18. Id. at 30.
1. By-Laws, Coleman Realty Co., Art. VIII, § 4.
2. By-Laws, Coleman Realty Co., Art. XI, § 1.
3. Unior

SToCK TRANSFER Acr § 15; CmuaSTy, THr TRANsR

oF SToci

75

(2d ed. 1940) ; 29 YALE L.J. 352 (1920). It does not necessarily follow that sale at
book valw would automatically be upheld if provided for only in a by-law.
4. Oppenheim, Collins & Co., Inc., v. Beir, 187 Misc. 428, 64 N.Y.S.2d 19
(1946); Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930),
16 VA. L. REV. 289; Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y. Supp.
873 (1919); BALLANTINE, CoRpoRATiSxs 779 (1946).

5. Garrett v. Phila. Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909) and recognized
as a by-law in In re Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A.2d 976 (1939).
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on the theory that such repeal invades the "vested rights" of the stockholders. 6 This may be true even if power to repeal is expressly given
to the majority. 7 What rights are to be given this protection has been
a question for the courts to determine. Pennsylvania provisions for charter
amendment and repeal of by-laws are extremely liberal; The former
gives power to the corporation to ".

.

. (4) increase or diminish its

authorized capital stock, or to reclassify the same by changing the number,
par value, designations, preferences, .

.

. or by changing shares with

par value into shares without par value. ..
," 8 Repeal of by-laws is
to be effected by a majority vote unless otherwise provided.9 There has
been little litigation centering around the validity of attempted amendment
or repeal. In two cases where beneficial societies provided for a specific
amount of remuneration to members under certain circumstances, and
then amended by-laws to lessen the amount, the court held that the right
to the former amount had "vested" in members already receiving benefits
and could not be tampered with. 10 On the other hand, in recent years
an amendment providing for recapitalization by replacing 6% preferred
participating stock with 7% non-participating, and cancelling cumulative
dividends by giving cash and new preferred stock, was held valid since
no "injustice" had been done and there was no evidence that the new
shares were not of equal value."' The repeal of a by-law providing for a
four out of five vote of directors for any action within their power was
held valid against objection that it was an irrevocable contract among
shareholders and was to run for the duration of the business. 12 In Johnson
v. Fuller13 the Circuit Court also reasoned in terms of "fairness" and
"justice" in reference to a new issue of prior preferred stock and debentures. In other jurisdictions, the alteration of stockholders' rights to
4
-accrued cumulative dividends,'
the substitution of new preferred stock
1
for old, and the repeal of cumulative voting provisions'", are examples
of attempted changes held invalid as a violation of the "vested rights"
6. "And it is the universally accepted rule that reserved power to alter, amend

or repeal by-laws cannot confer authority to make an amendment which will amount
to the destruction or impairment of the vested or contract rights of the member. . . ." 8 FLETCHER, CYcLOPEDIA CoRpoRAnoNs 663 (1931).
7. Early recognized in Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Corp., 78 N.Y. 159 (i879).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-801 (Purdon, 1950).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-304 (Purdon, 1950).
10. Marshall v. Pilot's Association, 206 Pa. 182, 55 At. 916 (1903) ; Becker v.
Berlin Beneficial Society, 144 Pa. 232, 22 Atl. 699 (1891).
11. Harvey v. National Drug Co., 30 D. & C. 318 (Pa. 1937).
12. Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 136, 8 A.2d 42 (1939).
13. 121 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1941), where the "right" was given by the articles.
14. Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.2d 618
(1941) ; Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936) ; Doss v.
Yingling, 204 Ind. 571, 185 N.E. 281 (1933).
15. Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1939).
16. Thistlethwaite v. Thistlethwaite, 101 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1950) ; Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 254 (1934) ; Lowenthal v. Rubber
Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 Atl. 454 (1894).
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of stockholders. Now, by the decision in the instant case, Pennsylvania
has added a shareholder's option to purchase outstanding corporate stock
1
to the list of untouchables.'
The concept of "vested rights" is illusory at best. It is a way of
pigeonholing a result once the court has made an interpretation. The
interesting feature of the Coleman case is the way the court interpreted
the by-law so that it became a pillar of minority rights. A by-law giving
first refusal to the corporation or stockholders may have a twofold purpose. First, it is used as a control device. 8 This is particularly true
where there is no one shareholder with a majority of shares and a change
of ownership of a few shares could alter the balance of power. As a
control device, the provision is normally adopted to protect large holders.
Secondly, it is of importance as a means of obtaining cohesion in the
corporation. It makes possible the selection of one's associates and fellow stockholders. 19 This is vital in a small corporation where the stockholders are also the directors and unity of interest is paramount. In this
latter instance, the by-law holds some importance for minority holders
because they are also concerned with cohesion. However, even here it is
probably of greater importance to large holders, particularly where a
majority of stock is held by one person. The instant case turns a provision normally designed to protect the interests of large holders into a
"vested right" of the minority. It is not, on the facts of this case, a control provision, since the incorporator held, and continued to hold, the
vast majority of stock, and needed no by-law protection for his interest.
Rather the factual situation indicates that the provision probably was intended to secure the cohesive purposes mentioned above. There is no
indication, however, that the provision was made to benefit the small
stockholders or that they relied on it. Certainly it is not as important to
shareholders as the right to accrued cumulative dividends or the right to
be represented on the board of directors by having cumulative voting.
Nor does the value of this "right" outweigh the blow dealt to the power
of repeal and change by majority vote. Power to amend should not be
discarded lightly; every provision removed from its reach diminishes its
effectiveness. So too with majority rule, since a requirement of unanimity
can be an effective stranglehold on corporate affairs 20 Whether the instant case signifies that the court will not share the liberal spirit of the
statute is still unknown. Certainly it seems out of line with prior cases.
Even assuming possible extenuating circumstances in the Coleman case
17. In Cowles v. Cowles Realty Co., 201 App. Div. 460, 194 N.Y. Supp. 546
(1922), a by-law imposing a restriction like that of the Coleman Co. was held not
repealable by a majority to the extent that an injunction pendente lite was granted
until final hearing.
18. See 42 HARv. L. Rrv. 555 (1929).
19. Compare provisions whereby stockholders are required to sell stock back
to the corporation when they retire or leave the employ of the corporation.
20. See Note, 19 ST. JonN's L. REv. 144 (1945).
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which would give the decision some merit, it should be limited to the facts
of this case. It is not hard to visualize different factual situations where
the application of the Coleman doctrine would bring even less desirable
results.

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS-ADmISSIBILITY

OF CON-

FESSIONS AFFECTED BY DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT-Shortly after his arrest
by a federal Secret Service Agent between 9 and 10 A.M., defendant was
taken to headquarters where, in response to questioning, he made a voluntary oral statement describing in complete detail his participation in
counterfeiting activities., The same facts were contained in a typewritten
statement which he read and signed that evening. The defendant was
not arraigned until the next morning, approximately twenty-three hours
after his arrest. The evidence indicates that no coercion of any sort had
been exerted, and that the defendant had been properly advised of his
right to remain silent. On appeal from his conviction, defendant contended
that the confessions, which had been received in evidence without objection, should have been excluded by the trial court on its own initiative
because made before the arraignment. The conviction was affirmed, the
court holding that the mere failure promptly to arraign a prisoner doesnot of itself render inadmissible in evidence a confession obtained before
the arraignment, and that since the facts of the case showed a reasonable
necessity for the delay, there was no error in admitting the confessions.'
Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1951).
Prior to 1943, the test applied by federal courts to determine the
admissibility of confessions was whether they were voluntary or involuntary.2 Then, in McNabb v. United States,3 the Supreme Court created an
additional test, which formed the basis of the appeal in the instant case.
The Court, in that case, reversed convictions on the ground that confessions used as evidence at the trial had been obtained in a manner which
violated federal procedure statutes requiring that an arrested person be
taken promptly before a committing officer. There was considerable confusion as to whether the opinion meant that the fact that the confessions
had been secured prior to arraignment was sufficient to warrant their
exclusion, 4 or whether additional factors, such as long and continuous
1. During the course of his initial interrogation, defendant told the officers of
evidence, in the form of photographic negatives, concealed in a laboratory where
the counterfeiting had taken place. Since a new tenant was moving into the laboratory the day of defendant's arrest, it was necessary to delay the arraignment long
enough for him to help locate these negatives or run the risk of losing completely the
valuable evidence which would tend to prove defendant's story.

2.

§4282 (2d ed. 1943).
It is worth noting that the decision did not involve

CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE

3. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

violation of Constitutional rights of the defendants, but was based solely on procedural grounds.
4. See Mitchell v. United States, 138 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev'l, 322
U.S. 65 (1944) ; United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943).
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questioning, were also an essential basis of the decision. 5 Some clarification was offered by United States v. Mitchell,6 decided the following year.
There the Court held admissible a confession made shortly after arrest,
even though the accused was not committed formally until eight days later,
the Court pointing up the fact that the admissions were not in any way
induced by the illegal detention, but were in fact received within a few
minutes after the accused reached the police station and before the detention became illegal. The Court stated that the power to exclude evidence
"is not to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining misconduct." 7 The
decision thus indicated that the confession had to be secured while the
accused was illegally detained, and intimated as well that the Court did
not consider the McNabb rule as a punitive measure to enforce compliance
with the law by police officers. This still left the scope of the doctrine
undefined. It was not until 1948, in Upshaw v. United States,8 that the
Court made a clear pronouncement of what it considered to be the proper
application of the rule. In that case there was no evidence of coercion, but
it was freely admitted by the prosecution that the confessions had been obtained as a result of holding the accused after his arrest for a period of
thirty hours before taking him before a committing magistrate, as required
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 The Court held the confessions inadmissible because secured as a direct result of illegal detention,
and emphasized that the reason the accused was so long detained was that
the arresting officers wished to secure the contested confessions.' 0 Thus,
the important factor in determining the admissibility of an otherwise voluntary confession became the ascertainment, not merely of whether the accused had been arraigned before confessing, but of whether his confession
was a product of illegal detention. As a result, lower federal courts, in
voluntary confession cases, have since looked to whether a defendant was in
fact illegally detained at the time he made his statement;" decisions have
5. See Gros v. United States, 136 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1943); United States v.
Klee, 50 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
6. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
7. Id. at 71.
8. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
9. FEo. R. Cam. P. 5 (a) (an officer making an arrest shall take the arrested

person "without unnecessary delay" before an officer empowered to commit). This
superseded the prompt arraignment statutes which were in effect when the McNabb
case was decided.
10. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948): "In this case we are
left in no doubt as to why this petitioner was not brought promptly before a committing magistrate. The arresting officer himself stated that petitioner was not carried before a magistrate on Friday or Saturday morning after his arrest on Friday
at 2 A. M., because the officer thought there was not 'a sufficient case' for the court
to hold him, adding that even 'if the Police Court did hold him we would lose custody

of him and I no longer would be able to question him.' Thus the arresting officer in
effect conceded that the confessions here were 'the fruits of wrongdoing' by the police
officers. He conceded more: He admitted that petitioner was illegally detained for at
least thirty hours for the very purpose of securing these challenged confessions. He
thereby refutes any possibility of an argument that after arrest he was carried before
a magistrate 'without unnecessary delay.'"
11. Carignan v. United States, 185 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1950); Patterson v.
United States, 183 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1950).
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delay." 12
revolved around the meaning of the words "without unnecessary
The courts have concerned themselves mostly with whether there was
sufficient time and opportunity to arraign the accused before he made his
confession, so that it has appeared that the McNabb and Upshaw cases
stand for the rigid rule that a delay in arraignment, whatever the other
facts, is illegal and will render inadmissible in evidence a confession obtained during that delay. The one exception appears in several decisions
which have gone so far as to hold that detention from the time of arrest
in the evening until the morning of the next business day was not illegal,
on the theory that the phrase does not require that the arrested person be
8
taken before a committing officer except during his regular office hours.'
Consideration of the McNabb, Mitchell and Upshaw decisions indicates
that the Court has been principally concerned with police violations of the
commitment statutes as those violations affect innocent suspects and has
used this doctrine as a means of protecting such accused persons. The
most likely reason for this attitude, on the part of the Court, would seem
to be a belief that unlawful detention is more likely than not to furnish
an opportunity for use of coercion, difficult for the defendant to prove, with
resultant confessions that tend to be unreliable. But this raises a question:
is this protection of the individual achieved at the expense of public welfare
in terms of lessening the efficiency of law enforcement officers? Much
criticism has been directed at the McNabb doctrine on this issue, calling
attention to the fact that the requirement of quick arraignment, without
opportunity for preliminary interrogation, would, in many instances, seriously hamper the operations of law enforcement bodies.' 4 For example,
if one member of a criminal conspiracy was arrested, it obviously would be
folly to arraign him, with the attendant publicity, until the other known
conspirators had been apprehended. Yet this would mean, if the mere
failure promptly to arraign a prisoner renders his detention illegal, that any
admissions of guilt the accused might make could never be used against
him in court, even though made through a desire to confess and get the
matter off his conscience. 15 The instant case, however, goes much further
than prior decisions in recognizing and applying the true spirit of the
McNabb doctrine. Instead of using a rigid standard which fails to consider
12. See note 9 supra.
13. Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
'U.S. 985 (1950); Garner v. United States, 174 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 945 (1949). This interpretation of the arraignment statutes was not new,
having been expressed at least as early as 1930- by a federal court in Janus v. United
States, 38 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1930). But, following the Upshaw case as they did,
these decisions pointed up one apparently effective means available to law officers for
avoiding the doctrine while still being able to work out a confession by long periods
of questioning.
14. See Inbau, The Confession Dilemmc in the United States Supreme Court,
43 ILLYL. Ray. 442 (1948) ; McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the
Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 239 (1946); Waite, Police Regulation by Rides of Evidence, 42 MIcE. L. Rzv. 679 (1944).
15. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 851 (3d ed. 1940) in which Professor Wigmore
expresses the opinion that the guilty are almost always psychologically ready to
confess when detected and at that moment are most likely to tell the full truth.
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the reasoning behind the rule, the present decision takes cognizance of the
apparent purpose of the rule-the protection of individuals from oppressive police interrogation practices. Two results are apparent: first, "without unnecessary delay" is being given a broader meaning so as to include
a consideration of factors other than the length of time it takes to walk a
prisoner to the nearest magistrate. Delays may also be-necessary in order
to apprehend accomplices. Second, and perhaps more far-reaching, to confine the rule within its proper limits requires an examination of the causal
relation of the illegal detention to the confession; in the instant case defendant's oral confession was made at once, not after long hours incommunicado.
This latter consideration, however, may prove the less desirable of the two,
for a prisoner's inability to prove that his illegal detention led to an involuntary confession was the very basis of the McNabb and Upshaw cases.
Aside from this, the present case represents a common-sense attitude
balancing individual rights with law enforcement in a more realistic way
than would be possible under a strict interpretation of these cases. Since
the prosecution will have the burden of proving that a delay in arraignment
was necessary and reasonable for proper law enforcement, the design of the
Upshaw rule to protect the individual should not be injured.

FEDERAL FOOD & DRUG AcT-ECONOMIc ADULTERATION-DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A FOOD HAS BEEN MADE TO "APPEAR BETTER OR

OF GREATER VALUE THAN IT Is"-While the primary purpose of the
Federal Food and Drug Act is to prevent the sale of hygienically adulterated
foods, a secondary objective is the protection of a gullible public from
artfully compounded products which, though harmless, masquerade as wellrecognized food items, i.e., commodities which have been economically
adulterated. In the Act of 1906 such shoddy foods were proscribed by
§ 7,1 which outlawed any product which was "mixed, colored, powdered,
coated or stained" in such manner as to conceal inferiority;but the section
left unanswered the question: Inferiority to what? Was all tinted oleomargarine to be condemned upon the ground that its color, texture, taste
and appearance concealed its "inferiority" to butter? This question was
answered by United States v. 10 Cases . . . Bred Spred.2 There a
food product which was fabricated to look and taste like jam, was cleared
from the charge of economic adulteration on the ground that since it did
not purport to be jam it could not be condemned as "inferior" jam.3 This
decision, which made it clear that a defined standard was a prerequisite to
a finding of adulteration under § 7, left the economic adulteration provision
1. FEDERl. PtuRE FooD & DRUG AcT § 7: "An article shall be deemed to be
adulterated, . . . If it be mixed, colored, powdered, coated, or stained in a manner
whereby damage or inferiority is concealed." 34 STAT. 769 (1906), 21 U.S.C.A. § 8
(1927) (Wiley Act).
2. 49 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1931).
3. Accord, United States v. Nesbitt Fruit Products, 96 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.
1938).
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virtually a dead letter.4 To revive the economic adulteration program,
the 1938 Act gave authority to the Administrator 5 to promulgate standards
of identity for foods. 6 In addition, it changed the wording of § 7 to provide that any product which had been made to "appear better or of greater
value than it [was]" by artificial admixture should now be deemed to be
economically adulterated. 7 The question remained whether, in the absence
of a defined standard, a food could be condemned solely by virtue of the
changed wording of § 7. Recently, an answer was provided in United
"Bireley's Orange Beverage," 187 F.2d 967 (3d
States v. 88 Cases . ..

Cir. 1951).
"Bireley's" is an orange drink containing 6% orange juice, 2%
lemon juice, 87% water, and artificial coloring. It is not deleterious. The
Government contended that since yellow coal tar dye had been added to
change the beverage's naturally unattractive appearance into a rich orange
color, the drink had been made to "appear better or of greater value than it
[was]." The court, while conceding that this allegation was at least
literally true, denied that a product can "appear better than it is" within the
meaning of the Act unless the food is made to appear to be some defined
superior product.'
The decision in the instant case returns the law of economic adulteration to the state in which it was under the 1906 Act and the Bred Spred
case. It is submitted that this return was proper. If the Government's
contention were to be allowed, all artificially colored products, e.g., commercial bread, canned vegetables, would be banned. It is doubtful, however, that Congress intended to ban harmlessly colored and flavored
products which cannot reasonably be confused with superior foods. 9 The
4. SEN. REP. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); DUNN, THE FEDERAL
FoOw, DRUG AND CosmETic Acr 118, 119, 480 (1938).
5. FEDERAL FooD, DRUG & CosmETic AcT § 401, 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21

U.S.C. § 341 (1946) (Copeland Act). The Food and Drug Adminitration is a
bureau of the Federal Security Agency, under the Federal Security Administrator.
6. See Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats, 318 U.S. 218, 230
(1943). To the same effect see Senate and House Committee Reports and Hearings
reprinted in Dunn, op. cit. sipra note 4, at 480, 890, 1237; TOULmIN, THE LAW
OF FooDs, DRUGS AND CosmalcS §§ 101-104 (1942); Markel, Reviewing Food
Standards, 6 FooD,

7.

FEDERAL

DRUG

Fool),

& CosmsEIc L.J. 191 (1951).

DRUG

& CosmEnc Acr § 402(b) (4) : "A food shall be deemed

to be adulterated . . . if any substance has been added thereto . . . so as to . . .

make it appear better or of greater value than it is." 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21
U.S.C. § 342(b) (4) (1946).
8. Instant case at 974. It was held that the United States could succeed only
by showing that the ordinary consumer confused Bireley's with pure orange juice.
Accord, Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Federal- Security Administrator, 132 F.2d 653
(8th Cir. 1943) (Oleomargarine is a food with identity of its own) ; United States
v. 36 Drums of Pop'n Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947) (mineral oil, artifically
colored to look like butter or vegetable oil, condemned) ; United States v. 2
Bags . . . Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945) (white poppy seeds, artificially colored to look like the more expensive Dutch Blue or Turkish Grey poppy
seeds, condemned).
9. Nothing has been found in the legislative history of the Act to disclose the
purpose of the rewording of the economic adulteration provisions. Apparently, it
was believed to be an improved expression of the same thing. See Cavers. The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 6 LAW & CoNTMP. PROB. 2, 27 (1939).
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Act itself discloses anticipation of the use of artificial coloring and artificial
flavoring. 10 To set so vague a standard as a basis of condemnation of
property would raise the threat of failure to satisfy constitutional requirements of due process. Further, the result in the instant case is practically,
as well as legally, unobjectionable. The economic adulteration sections
of the Act have not been vitiated. A shoddy food can still be condemned
as economically adulterated where the consumer is led to confuse it with
(1) a pure food, (2) a state 11 or federal standard for fabricated foods,
or conceivably, (3) a standard so well established by industry practice and
consumer expectation as to be definable. Although the Administrator may
encounter difficulties in establishing a standard for orange drinks in accordance with the strict procedural requirements of the present Act, it is
now clear that artificially colored food products are not, without more,
economically adulterated.

LABoR-TAFT-HARTLEY AcT-SECONDARY BoycoTts-Unions instigated strikes by union employees of subconstractors performing work on
the same construction projects upon wfhich subcontractors employing nonunion labor were also engaged. The unions had standing disputes with
the non-union subcontractors which had arisen prior to the instant projects,
but had no quarrel with the other subcontractors or general contractor
other than that the latter had engaged a non-union subcontractor. In each
case the Supreme Court found that an object of the strike was to force
the general contractor or owner to terminate his contract with the subcontractor employing non-union labor I and held, with three dissents, that
the union had committed an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
§ 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 NLRB v. Denver Trades Council, 71 Sup. Ct. 943 (1951) ; Brotherhood of ElectricalWorkers v. NLRB,
71 Sup. Ct. 954 (1951) ; Brotherhood of Carpenters& Joiners v. NLRB,
71 Sup. Ct. 966 (1951).
This section, first interpreted by the Court inthe instant cases, makes
itan unfair labor practice ". . . for a labor organization . . . to engage
10. FEDERAL FooD, DRUG & CosMETc AcT, supra note 5, §§402(c), 406(b)
(provides for use of U.S. certified coloring), §402(d) (excepts harmless coloring
from the prohibited additives in re confectionery), § 403(k) (requires disclosure
of artificial flavoring and artificial coloring).
The Food and Drug Administration itself has authorized the use of artificial
colors as long as the label discloses the fact. TC-195, March 15, 1940 (coloring in
flour), TC-210, March 21, 1940 (coloring in caviar), reported in 1 CCII, FOOD,
DRUG AND CosMETc LAW REP. 3172.

11. Pennsylvania has established standards for Orange Drink, a beverage classification in which Bireley's Orange Beverage falls, and with which it complies, setting
a minimum of 6% orange juice and authorizing optional ingredients including certified
food coloring. Dept. of Agriculture, Bureau of Foods and Chemistry (Pa.), Official

Bulletin, tit. 2, c. XVI, No. 1618 (1948).
1. Such termination occurred in two of the three cases.
2. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1950).
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in, or to induce or encourages the employees of any employer to engage in,
a strike . . . where an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any
."
employer . . . to cease doing business with any other person.
It is generally said that this provision outlaws the "secondary boycott," '
although that term is nowhere used in the Act. In placing this construction upon it the NLRB and the courts have tended to substitute for
an application of the terms of the section to the factual circumstances involved their own conceptions of what constitutes, a "secondary boycott."
Such conceptions have necessarily been influenced by the courts' convictions as to what constitutes a legitimate use of economic force by a union
when faced with a particular situation. The result has been a refusal to
condemn certain kinds of union activity which a literal reading of the terms
of the section would prohibit. Thus where a union strikes or pickets
the premises of employer A, with whom it has a dispute, such pressure is
not held to violate § 8(b) (4) (A) simply because one of the objects of
such activity is to induce employees of B, a supplier or customer of A,
to refuse to enter A's premises to deliver or pick up goods, thus forcing
B to "cease doing business" with A. 5 The Board and the courts have
sanctioned such incidental activity 6 and refused to give the section an interpretation that would outlaw most picketing. The courts have gone
even further than the Board in giving the section a restrictive interpretation. In two cases involving the contractor-subcontractor relationship the
union was engaged in a dispute with the main contractor. In order to
exert pressure on the main contractor the union in one case 7 picketed the
subcontractor and in the other 8 caused his employees to strike, the object
being to prevent the subcontractors from performing their contracts with
the main contractor. Finding that the main and subcontractor were economic "allies" and that § 8(b) (4) (A) was designed to protect only third3. The Court found in the Electrical Workers case, unlike the two companion
cases, that the union had not itself engaged in the strike but had induced the strike

by peaceful picketing. The union contested the constitutionality of § 8(b) (4) (A) on
the ground that in outlawing peaceful picketing the section contravened the constitutional guarantee of free speech. In upholding its constitutionality the Court re-

affirmed its decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948), that

there is no constitutional abridgment in prohibiting picketing that is directed towards
an unlawful objective.
4. For a definition of a "secondary boycott" by the Supreme Court, see Duplex
Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1921).
5. Re Interborough News Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 297 (1950). See Re Pure Oil Co.,

84 N.L.RtB. 315 (1949), in which the Board said: "A strike by its very nature,
inconveniences those who customarily do business with the struck employer. Moreover, any accompanying picketing of the employer's premises is necessarily designed
to induce and encourage third persons to cease doing business with the picketed
employer. It does not follow, however, that such picketing is therefore proscribed

by § 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act . .. ."
6. For a collection of cases classified and discussed in terms of the factual cir-

cumstances in which incidental secondary activity was held not to be prohibited by
§ 8(b) (4) (A) see Developments in the Law-The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HAsv. L.
REv. 781, 800-802 (1951).
7. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
8. Mills v. United Ass'n Journeymen and Apprentices, 83 F. Supp. 240 (W.D.
Mo. 1949).
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party neutrals to a dispute 9 the courts in both cases concluded that the
relationship between the contractor and subcontractor was not one of "doing
business" within the meaning of the section and that no "secondary boycott" had occurred.' 0 The Court rejected the "ally" doctrine in the instant cases. In reversing the judgment in the Denver case, in which the
circuit court had applied that doctrine," the Court approved the Board's
conclusion that the general contractor and the non-union subcontractor were
doing business.' 2
Rejection of the "ally" doctrine indicates that the Court will not sanction unlimited judicial straying from the plain meaning of the terms used
in the section. The result will be interpretations that are closer to legislative intent than would be the case were courts permitted to decide what
conduct does or does not constitute a "secondary boycott." '3 .However,
there is merit in the contention that a union involved in a labor dispute
with a subcontractor over the latter's refusal to hire union labor, a legitimate
union grievance, should be permitted to engage in practices designed to
force the general contractor to terminate his contract with the subcontractor. -Not only is the general contractor obtaining the services of a
subcontractor at a cheaper rate than if the latter employed union labor,
but in engaging the subcontractor he is indulging in the very labor practice
to which the union objects: through the intermediate subcontractor the general contractor is performing the job he has undertaken with non-union
labor.
The effect of the decisions on attempts to organize non-union labor
will be felt to a greater extent in the construction industry than elsewhere.
One of the traditional rules of construction unions is that their members
shall not work on the same jobs as non-union workers. The object of
the rule has been to prevent the hiring of the contractor employing nonunion labor and by such pressure to persuade him to employ union men.
The object of this, in turn, is to persuade the non-union man to join the
union. The means used by the union to enforce the rule has been that of
calling all union men off a job on which a subcontractor employing nonunion labor is also engaged, a means now denied it. This rule and its
enforcement have proved to be the most effective means of organizing
9. There is some support for the "ally" doctrine in the legislative history of the
section based on the following statement by Senator Taft: "This provision makes it
unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third person
who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees." 93 CoixG. Rsc. 4198 (1947).
10. The Board has not applied the "ally" doctrine. See Metal Polishers Union,
86 N.L.R.B. 1243, 1252 (1949) ; but cf. Nat'l Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards,
87 N.L.R.B. 54, 56 (1949).
11. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. N.L.R.B., 186 F.2d 326 (D.C.
Cir. 1950).
12. 71 Sup. Ct. at 952.
13. It is noteworthy, however, that the Court has apparently approved the doctrine
that incidental secondary activity does not constitute a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A).
See NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 961 (1951), decided the same day
as the instant cases.
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workers in the industry. Because labor in the industry is migratory
and the duration of the employer-emplpyee relationship between individual
employer and worker is usually confined to the particular construction
project, the union is denied the more conventional means of persuading
workers to organize, 14 and is by this decision denied the only effective
alternative.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-ELIGIBILITY OF A DISCHARGED
EMPLOYEE WHO HAS ELECTED TO RECEIVE A LUMP SuM SEVERANCE
PAYMENT OPTIONAL BY CONTRACT-Western Union entered into a con-

tract with AFL Commercial Telegraphers Union providing for certain alternative benefits for employees who would be discharged as a result of
increased mechanization of telegraph operations. Such employees could
select one of several benefits, including acceptance of severance pay in a
lump sum, with the amount based on four weeks' pay at the latest rate for
each year of service. A discharged employee elected to accept severance
pay, and received a lump sum amounting to twenty-four weeks' wages.
Three days after discharge she filed claim for benefits under the state unemployment compensation act. The state employment and security division
granted the claim, holding that the severance payment constituted compensation for past services, and not for the twenty-four weeks following
separation. On appeal the court affirmed the decision holding the claimant
eligible for benefits, but repudiated the construction placed on the nature
of severance pay by both the state board and the company. It held that
severance pay was in no way related to or dependent upon the employee's
employment status after separation, nor was it compensation for past services; the length of service was merely used as the yardstick in determining
the amount of severance pay due a discharged employee. Ackerson. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 48 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1951).
The Minnesota statute provides that an individual is to be considered
unemployed in any week during which he performs no service and with
respect to which no wages are payable to him; 1 and that an individual shall
not be eligible to receive benefits for any week with respect to which he
has received remuneration in an amount equal to or in excess of his weekly
benefit amount in the form of a dismissal payment.2 The court held that
the claimant met both of the requirements of an unemployed person under
the first provision, and was not disqualified under the second provision.
At least two other appellate courts have considered the effect of an industrial
pension 3 and bonus in lieu of vacation 4 on the recipient's eligibility for un14. See Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and
Construction Industry, 60 YALE LJ. 673 (1951).
1. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.04, subd. 23; to the same effect see PA. STAT. ANNT.

tit. 43, § 753 (u) (Purdon, Supp. 1949).
2. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.08. subd. 3.

3. Keystone Mining Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 167
Pa Super. 256, 75 A.2d 3 (1950) ; 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 711 (1951).
4. Renown Stove Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm'n., 328
Mich. 436, 44 N.W.2d 1 (1950); 64 HARv. L. Rmv. 681 (1950).
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employment compensation under similar statutes, and have arrived at
similar results. Dismissal-pay or severance-pay provisions, however, have
to date been relatively uncommon in union agreements.8 Probably for this
reason the Minnesota court seems to have been the first court of last resort
to be faced with the issue of eligibility for unemployment compensation of a
recipient of severance pay. Those state compensation boards and employment and security divisions which have passed on the matter are divided in
their conclusions. 0 A majority of these have held that such severance payments should be considered as wages in the future from the date of separation and that the employee is ineligible for benefits until the expiration of
the number of weeks for which payment was so made. Such an interpretation of the unemployment compensation laws has been based on the rationale
that severance payments were intended to cushion the shock of separation
from employment and should be considered as advance wages allocated
over the number of weeks, from the date of separation, which had been
used in computing the amount payable. The Minnesota court agreed that
if that theory of severance payments were to be adopted, the claimant would
be ineligible for unemployment compensation until the expiration of the
period over which the severance payment was so allocated.- But the court
rejected such an interpretation, concluding that the severance pay was
neither "wages payable" nor "remuneration received" for the twenty-four
weeks following separation.
The primary purposes of the unemployment compensation laws are
generally set forth in the same terms as by the Minnesota legislature: to
provide against employees' economic insecurity, maintain purchasing power,
and limit the social consequences of poor-relief assistance.7 The court dismissed, perhaps summarily, the argument that the economic security of the
claimant was stabilized and her purchasing power maintained by the severance payment, making her receipt of unemployment compensation out of
line with the purpose of the act and placing her in a better financial position
than when she was employed. Yet its conclusion seems well warranted.
First, need or actual indigency is not a requirement for eligibility for compensation.8 Receipt of income from other sources does not disqualify a
5. Such clauses are prevalent (50% or more of contracts) only in the communications, rubber, and printing and publishing industries. See Chase and Nix, DirmisAW
Pay Provisions in Union Agreements, 1949, 70 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 384 (1950).
6. Decisions holding employee eligible: Illinois, 3 CCH UNzMP. INS. REP.
118349.18 (1950); Oklahoma, 6 CCH UNEmp. INs. REP. 118073.10 (1950); Texas,
7 CCH UN-zmp. INS. REP. 118149 (1951). Decisions holding employee ineligible:
California, 2 CCH UNz~m. INs. REP. 118605.02 (1949); Florida, 3 CCH UNMP.
INS. REP. 118109.12 (1950); Pennsylvania, 6 CCH UNEm-P. INs. REP. g 1995.01
(1946). Of these decisions, all except those of California and Pennsylvania involved
the same union contract as that in the Ackerson case.
7. MiNx. STAT. ANN. § 268.03; 30 CoNsoL LAws OF N.Y. § 501; P.. S AT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (Purdon, 1941). For a discussion of these and other purposes
of the statutes, see Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1945) ; Harrison, Eligibility and Disqualificationfor Benefits, 55 YZx L.J. 117, 118 (1945).
8. See Burns, supra note 7, at 2.
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claimant, for the purpose of these laws is to supplement a person's resources
during periods of unemployment. 9
Second, the claimant concededly
would have received the severance payment even if she had obtained a
new job immediately upon dismissal. Third, the contract specifically provided that acceptance of separation pay would terminate the employee's
service with the company-rendering further untenable the company's
position that the severance pay was in fact wages paid for the weeks
subsequent to dismissal.' 0 Fourth, the reasons for unions seeking the
inclusion of a severance-payment clause in working agreements extend
beyond a mere attempt to ease the employee's immediate financial burden
while looking for a new job. Severance pay is also intended as partial
compensation for loss of seniority rights, loss of possible pension rights,
and compensation for retraining or acquiring new skills," the latter being
especially applicable in the present case. From the employer's viewpoint,
severance pay clauses are included as a means of maintaining good will,
both as to workers and to the community.' 2 These factors strongly suggest
that the parties to the contract intended the severance payment clause
to have no relation to the worker's employment status after dismissal, and,
more significantly, that the court reached the proper result in concluding
that, in view of the terms of the contract, there should be no relation between eligibility -for unemployment compensation and -receipt of severance
pay.
Accepting the court's decision here as sound and one likely to be followed, the question arises whether an employer in the future can avoid such
double liability-payment of severance pay together with the adverse effect
of the" claimant's recovery of benefits upon the company's contribution
rate to the unemployment compensation fund . 3 -by contracting to have
the severance allowance paid in weekly installments following separation.
Whether such an arrangement in express terms would achieve a result
opposite from the one reached in this case is conjectural; the Minnesota
court said that it might. But in view of the fact that organized labor is
already apparently dissatisfied with both severance pay and the present
unemployment compensation system as means of providing real security
to the worker,' 4 it seems highly unlikely that unions in future negotiations
of contracts contemplating severance pay will be inclined to agree to the
addition of a weekly-installment clause and thereby assist employers in any
attempts to avoid the impact of the Minnesota court's decision.
9. See Ellickson, Labor's Demand for Real Employment Security, 55 YAIE
LJ. 253, 254-255 (1945).
10. Cf. Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa. Super.
9, 63 A.2d 489 (1949) (holding employee ineligible where severance payment was
made voluntarily and was designated as wages for a specific future period of time.)
11. See Chase and Nix, supra note 5, at 384.
12. Ibid.
13. The employer's contribution to the fund varies with the degree of employment stability the employer maintains. For a detailed discussion of the contribution
system, see Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 YAi L.J. 218 (1945); Rainwater, The
Fallacy of Experiene Rating, 2 LAiOR L.J. 95.
14. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 261.

